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CREDITOR CONTROL IN FINANCIALLY
DISTRESSED FIRMS: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
STUART C. GILSON
MICHAEL R. VETSUYPENS*
Until recently, academic research in corporate finance has had little to
say about how corporate ownership and control are affected when
companies default on their debt or file for bankruptcy. Most theories of
optimal capital structure, for example, typically model bankruptcy as a
wholesale transfer of the firm's assets to creditors. Ownership claims in
the firm are redistributed according to the rule of absolute priority, and pre-
petition stockholders receive nothing. The reality, of course, is much more
complicated. Various legal and regulatory penalties effectively limit
creditors' ability to influence resource allocation in troubled companies.
Commercial banks, for example, are prohibited from holding significant
amounts of stock in nonbank firms under section 16 of the Glass-Steagall
Act, the Bank Holding Company Act, and the Federal Reserve Board's
Regulation Y (exceptions to these rules exist when banks receive equity in
settlement of a troubled loan, but the equity must be divested after a few
years). Similar restrictions apply to insurance companies.' Creditors who
take too active a role in corporate governance-for example, by forcing the
ouster of top managers and corporate directors-also face the risk of having
their claims equitably subordinated in bankruptcy, or of being sued under
lender liability laws.
From the standpoint of financial economists, the uncertainty that
surrounds the role of creditors in corporate governance is undesirable. The
* Stuart C. Gilson is an Assistant Professor at the Harvard Business School, and Michael R.
Vctsuypens is an Associate Professor at the Edwin L. Cox School of Business, Southern Methodist
University. The authors are grateful for research support provided by the Division of Research at
Harvard Business School and the Leo F. Corrigan Junior Fellowship at Southern Methodist University.
1. For example, life insurance companies domiciled in New York cannot have more than 2% of
their assets invested in the stock of any one issuer; similar restrictions exist in 39 other states (covering
both life and property-casualty insurers). In a recent paper, Gilson shows that such institutional
restrictions on creditor equity ownership make it difficult for firms to reduce their leverage in
bankruptcies or out-of-court debt restructurings. See Stuart C. Gilson, Debt Reduction, Optimal Capital
Structure, and Renegotiation of Claims During Financial Distress (Harvard Business School Working
Paper) (on file with the Washington University Law Quarterly).
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goal of economic efficiency will be best served when decision and control
rights in the firm reside with the firm's residual claimholders-those whose
wealth directly rises or falls with marginal changes in firm value. When
a firm is clearly insolvent, and the face value of outstanding debt far
exceeds the present discounted value of the assets, creditors, as the residual
claimants, should have authority to decide how the firm's assets are
allocated.2 However, legal and other institutional barriers may prevent
creditors from acting in this role, and consequently the firm's assets may
not be put to their most productive use.
In addition, uncertainty over creditors' appropriate role in the governance
of financially distressed firms clouds the roles and responsibilities of
corporate managers and directors. Efficient resource allocation requires that
managers and directors act as agents for the firm's residual claimholders.
When a firm is trying to renegotiate its debt contracts, however, it is often
unclear where management's loyalties should lie. When a firm is highly
leveraged, and the debt is risky, the market value of both debt and equity
claims will typically be quite sensitive to changes in firm value. Moreover,
even though creditors nominally hold only fixed claims, they can be viewed
as "stockholders in waiting," since they often acquire sizable shareholdings
once their claims are restructured (although, to further complicate matters,
these holdings necessarily may be only temporary). Although these
considerations suggest that management of troubled companies should take
the interests of both shareholders and creditors into account when setting
corporate policy, until recently, corporate officers have had a formal
fiduciary duty only to shareholders. A recent Delaware court decision has
established a broader definition of directors' duties that includes consider-
ation of an insolvent firm's total enterprise value-and thus the welfare of
creditors as well as stockholders.3 However, the practical implications of
2. For a general discussion of the optimal allocation of decision and control rights in the firm,
see Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395 (1983).
3. See Credit Lyonnais Bank Netherland N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., No. Civ. A.
12150, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). This case involved a dispute between the
primary bank lender to bankrupt MGM-Pathe Communications Company, and the company's principal
stockholder, Giancarlo Parretti, who indirectly held 98.5% of the firm's outstanding stock through his
affiliation with Pathe. Unable to repay the bank's loan, the company granted the bank effective control
over the board of directors, with the understanding that control would revert back to Parretti if the
bank's loan was reduced by a certain amount within a specified period of time. Shortly after the
company emerged from Chapter 11, the bank, over the objections of the principal stockholder, rejected
the proposed sale of two important assets (proceeds from which would have gone into paying down the
bank's debt). Parretti and Pathe challenged the bank's decision as constituting a breach of its fiduciary
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this ruling for day-to-day management of firms in financial distress are still
far from clear.
In this Article we present the results of empirical research that examines
how creditor control is manifested in financially troubled firms that have
to renegotiate their debt contracts. Even though creditors are generally
constrained from taking a direct management role in these firms, this
research shows that creditors are able to influence corporate policies
indirectly by imposing highly restrictive covenants in restructured lending
agreements, replacing senior management, and influencing the terms of
senior executives' compensation. The main protagonists in virtually all of
these cases are banks and other senior institutional lenders rather than
public bondholders or trade creditors. Such documentary evidence provides
some useful behavioral benchmarks for creditors and managers of
financially distressed firms, and helps sharpen the debate over what role
creditors should play in the governance of financially troubled companies.
I. RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
When firms approach insolvency, and are in immediate danger of
defaulting on their debt contracts, they face two alternatives to outright
liquidation: they can file for bankruptcy, or they can restructure their debt
out of court. Out-of-court restructuring is economically equivalent to
formal bankruptcy, because the firm's fixed claims are either renegotiated
or replaced with new claims on terms that reduce the firm's overall fixed
payment burden. Negotiating an out-of-court settlement is generally in the
interest of all of the firm's claimholders because this alternative appears to
be much less costly than formal bankruptcy; however, firms will file for
Chapter 11 when claimholders are unable to agree on how to split the cost
savings.4
duty to the company's stockholders-a duty that arose because of the bank's control over the board.
In finding for the defendant, the court opined that "[a]t least where a corporation is operating in the
vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors is not merely the agent of the residu[al] risk bearers, but
owes its duty to the corporate enterprise." Id. at *108.
4. For evidence on what determines the choice between Chapter 11 and out-of-court restructuring
in publicly traded firms, see Stuart C. Gilson et al., Troubled Debt Restructurings: An Empirical Study
of Private Reorganization of Firms in Default, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 315 (1990). Consistent with out-of-
court restructuring being less costly than Chapter 11, Gilson et al. find that the announcement of a
successful out-of-court restructuring (i.e., avoidance of Chapter 11) is associated with an average 40%
run-up in common stock values, relative to the commencement of negotiations to restructure firms' debt.
In contrast, common stock values decline by 40% on average when firms are unsuccessful in
19941 1007
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In a recent study (summarized in Table I below), one of the authors finds
that commercial banks often acquire extensive influence over firms'
operating and financial policies in out-of-court restructurings through the
use of highly restrictive loan covenants.5 In addition to granting the firm
financial concessions (e.g., lower interest rates, or forgiveness of past-due
interest or principal), creditors can demand increased protection by placing
restrictions on the firm's investment and financing activities. In normal
times, loan covenants confer control on creditors only "contingent-
ly"-when the firm defaults on the covenants, creditors have the right to
accelerate full payment of their claims. Following a default, however,
creditors often acquire direct control over corporate policies.
restructuring their debt out of court, and are forced to file for bankruptcy. Gilson et al. also show that
attempts to restructure debt are more likely to succeed when there are fewer distinct classes of creditors,
relatively more debt is owed to banks and insurance companies, and more of the firm's value consists
of growth opportunities and other intangible assets (as opposed to hard "assets-in-place").
5. See Stuart C. Gilson, Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Blockholders, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 355
(1990).
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Table I
Creditor control conferred by restrictive covenants in restructured bank loans.
Results are based on 40 firms that restructured their debt out of court during 1979-1985.
Covenants are identified from the Moody's manuals, the Wall Street Journal, and firms'
10-K reports. Source: Stuart C. Gilson, Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Blockholders,
27 J. FIN. ECON. 355 (1990).
Percentage
Covenant of firms
Panel A. Decisions and policies over which creditors are granted veto power
" Dividends and stock repurchases 48%
" Additional borrowing 15
• Capital expenditures 10
" Divestitures 8
" Firm's annual operating budget 8
" Mergers and other combinations 5
" Sale of new equity 3
" Redemption of subordinated debt 3
" Senior management hiring and firing decisions 3
Panel B. General restrictions on corporate policies
Asset dispositions
" Creditors granted increased security interest in firm's assets 73%
" Restructured debt must be prepaid with proceeds of any divestitures 55
" Cap on level of divestitures 23
" Creditors granted ownership in assets directly 13
* Restriction on asset transfers to and from subsidiaries 10
" Restriction on firm's ability to collateralize assets 5
Financing activity
" Cap on level of borrowing 50
" Proceeds of new financings must be used to prepay restructured debt 8
" New common stock must be sold as condition of debt restructuring 8
Payouts to shareholders
. Cap on dividends and stock repurchases 38
New investment
" Cap on level of capital expenditures 30
" Restriction on permitted kinds of investment 23
" Cap on cumulative investment in specified assets 5
Operating activities
" Cap on general and administrative expenses 25
" Increased financial reporting requirements to creditors 13
Management activities
" Default declared if current CEO or chairman of the board leaves 3
" Creditors permitted to attend board meetings 3
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As shown in Panel A, a significant percentage of the firms studied gave
creditors actual veto power over firms' dividend and payout policies, capital
expenditures, divestitures, mergers, new financing, and senior management
hiring and firing decisions. In such cases, creditors arguably exercise more
control over the corporation's activities than shareholders are able to
exercise in normal times (especially when firms' shares are diffusely held).
A similarly large percentage of restructurings enacted more general
restrictions on firms' investment and financing policies (Panel B). Such
restrictions potentially benefit creditors by making it more difficult for
managers to increase the riskiness of the firm's assets or reduce coverage
on the debt.6 Most often, these restrictions take the form of a cap on the
level of some activity, such as capital expenditures, divestitures, shareholder
payouts, or total borrowing. Restrictions on asset dispositions are the most
common type of restriction, and come closest in spirit to the assumption
underlying many option pricing models and theoretical models of
bankruptcy-that creditors literally take control of the firm's assets when
it defaults on its debt.' Interestingly, the covenants shown in Table I are
quite similar to those found in leveraged buyouts and other highly
leveraged transactions, where, unlike the financially distressed firms
examined here, leverage is increased by choice.'
In addition to preserving the value of creditors' claims, covenant-based
restrictions on firms' investment and financing activities can increase total
firm value by preventing managers from taking actions that enrich
shareholders but reduce the present value of total cashflows generated by
the firm's assets. However, such a characterization, while standard in
corporate finance textbooks, assumes that managers act as agents for the
firm's shareholders. As seen below, managers of financially distressed
firms are sometimes explicitly beholden to the firm's creditors, because the
creditors either appoint the managers or set their compensation. This
suggests the possibility that the covenants documented in Table I may in
fact go "too far"--causing firms to forgo risky, but profitable, investment
6. For an analysis of the economic function of debt covenants, see Clifford W. Smith, Jr. &
Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117
(1979).
7. See, e.g., Jeremy I. Bulow & John B. Shoven, The Bankruptcy Decision, 9 BELL J. ECON. 437
(1978); Bradford Cornell et al., Financial Distress, Capital Infusions, and Optimal Default (University
of California at Los Angeles Working Paper, 1993).
8. See George P. Baker & Karen H. Wruck, Organizational Changes and Value Creation In
Leveraged Buyouts: The Case of The O.M. Scott & Sons Company, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 163 (1989).
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opportunities. Such an opportunity loss, if it exists, represents a cost of
financial distress that has heretofore received little attention from corporate
financial economists.
II. CREDITOR-INITIATED MANAGEMENT CHANGES
In a recent study, one of the authors finds that creditors frequently
initiate senior management changes when firms are financially distressed.9
The study analyzed 381 publicly held firms that experienced severe stock
price declines, and found that there was a 52% likelihood of observing
senior management turnover in any year that a firm was bankrupt or
restructuring its debt out of court. (Senior management turnover was
defined as any change in the identity of the firm's top management team,
including the chairman, CEO, and president). According to public sources
(e.g., newspaper accounts and company annual reports), banks were
responsible for forcing out incumbent managers, or appointing new
managers, in one out of every five such management changes."0 Public
bondholders or trade creditors, in contrast, were never identified as having
played a role in replacing management."
In bankrupt firms, creditors sometimes effect the removal of senior
managers by proposing a new management team in the firm's plan of
9. See Stuart C. Gilson, Management Turnover and Financial Distress, 25 J. FIN. EcoN. 241
(1989). This study presents logit regression evidence that high turnover in financially distressed firms
is specifically caused by high leverage, or factors related to firms' bankruptcy or debt restructuring,
rather than past declines in profitability (that ultimately may have led to default or bankruptcy). Results
cited below also draw on Stuart C. Gilson, Management-Borne Costs of Financial Distress (1988)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Rochester (New York)).
10. A related study by both authors reports similar findings. See Stuart C. Gilson & Michael R.
Vetsuypens, CEO Compensation in Financially Distressed Firms: An Empirical Analysis, 48 J. FIN.
425 (1993). Results similar to ours are reported by Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford,
Corporate Governance in the Bankntptcy' Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U.
PA. L. REv. 669, 742-47 (1993). Based on news reports and interviews with attorneys, they found that
creditors "participated" in 18 of 40 CEO firings in large publicly traded firms that filed for Chapter 11.
Id.
11. For two reasons, these and other results cited herein may understate the actual role played by
public bondholders in the governance of financially distressed companies. First, the studies that we
reference are mostly based on cases taken from the 1980s, when activity by so-called "vulture
investors," and active trading in distressed securities, was less developed. Extending the analysis to
include more recent cases would no doubt uncover cases where bondholders exerted considerable
influence over corporate policies. Second, the majority of firms studied had no publicly traded debt,
which is true of U.S. public companies in general.
19941 1011
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reorganization.' 2 Anecdotal evidence and several recent academic studies
suggest that whether creditors are successful in pushing these and other
initiatives through will depend in part on where the bankruptcy case is
heard. For example, judges who sit in the Southern District of New York
are believed to be more favorably disposed to debtors than creditors; in the
Southern District of Florida, judges' biases are said to run in the opposite
direction. t
In firms that restructure their debt out of court, creditors can threaten to
vote against the firm's restructuring plan and force it into bankruptcy unless
senior management is replaced. This threat will be more credible when
creditors' claims are relatively more senior or secured, and shareholders'
expected losses in bankruptcy are relatively more severe. Related evidence
suggests that shareholders suffer significant wealth losses when attempts to
restructure debt out of court break down and their firms file for Chapter
11.14
In the aforementioned study, approximately three out of four firms in
which creditors forced a senior management change were, at the time,
attempting to restructure their debt out of court. In the remaining twenty-
five percent of cases involving bankrupt firms, creditors threatened to
petition the court to have a trustee appointed unless managers resigned.
However, in only one instance was a manager removed by the bankruptcy
12. For example, the reorganization plan of Worlds of Wonder Inc. (submitted by the company's
banks and unsecured creditors) explicitly provided for the resignation of its founder, chairman and CEO,
Donald Kingsborough. See Carrie Dolan, Worlds of Wonder's Founder Resigns From Top Jobs at
Request of Creditors, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 1988, at A23. As part of the agreement, the company also
agreed to pay Kingsborough a lump sum of $212,500 for "emotional distress."
13. Academic studies that consider the differential treatment of debtors and creditors across
bankruptcy jurisdictions include Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and Fonm
Shopping in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 11,
and Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of Claims, 27
J. FIN. ECON. 285 (1990). Determining whether a particular judge is creditor- or debtor-"friendly" is
obviously a subjective exercise. One judge in Miami exhibited explicit concern for creditors' interests
by ordering the removal of clothing retailer Cascade Intemational's two top executives, "citing their
inability to detect various frauds" that were committed in the company. See Daniel Pearl, Judge Orders
Removal of Two Cascade Officials, WALL ST. J., June 1, 1992, at A4. The judge justified his decision
by noting that the Cascade officials "carry a 'significant taint' that makes it difficult for the company's
creditors to trust them." Id. More systematically, LoPucki and Whitford find that judges extend debtor
exclusivity more often in the Southern District of New York than in other jurisdictions (even though
these cases tend to run for longer than cases in other jurisdictions). LoPucki & Whitford, supra.
14. See Gilson et al., supra note 4.
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court and a trustee actually installed.' 5
Creditors, unlike shareholders in conventional contests for corporate
control, were able to bring about management changes without owning a
significant amount of firms' voting stock. In only two cases studied (out
of a total of twenty-five) did creditors own a significant percentage of
firms' equity, and in neither case was it possible to say whether the
management change occurred as a result of creditors exercising their
explicit voting power. Although in five cases bank representatives sat on
the board when a management change occurred, this presence always
reflected an association of long standing. In most cases these directors
resigned to avoid conflicts of interest following the commencement of
restructuring talks.
Consistent with the above findings, we also found that significant
shareholdings by managers were not an effective defense against creditor
initiatives to replace them. In one case studied, senior managers were
forced out even though they collectively owned 44% of the firm's
outstanding common shares. This finding is perhaps not surprising, given
that original shareholders' claims are often severely diluted (or eliminated)
due to the issuance of a majority of new shares to creditors under firms'
bankruptcy reorganization or debt restructuring plans.' 6
Departing managers were replaced by outsiders (i.e., managers who had
little or no past affiliation with the firm) in 55% of all cases where
management turnover was caused by creditors. In contrast, 34% of all
management changes in financially distressed firms resulted in outside
appointments.' The threat of lender liability may create an added
15. This is the case of Auto-Train, which filed for bankruptcy in 1980. As reported by the Wall
Street Journal:
In Mr. Drabkin's first few weeks as trustee, he went to court to block two major creditors
from pulling the tracks out from under the company's trains, and won court permission to fire
Auto-Train's founder, president and chief executive officer, Eugene Garfield. In his petition,
he told the court that if Mr. Garfield remained, the company would have 'little or no
credibility among those upon whom the company depends for its survival.'
Auto-Train Trustee Plans Court Action to Remove Company's Two Top Officers, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9,
1980, at A5. Consistent with our evidence, LoPucki and Whitford found that a trustee was appointed
in only 5% of the bankruptcies they studied. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 10, at 699.
16. We conjecture that a given percentage shareholding in a financially distressed firm will confer
greater effective voting power on the holder when the firm is relatively less insolvent, and fewer new
shares will have to be issued to return the firm's financial leverage to its "normal" level.
17. A new manager was considered to be an outside replacement if he or she had been affiliated
with the firm for less than three years. The same definition of outside replacements is used by Gilson
& Vetsuypens, supra note 10, at 442. The results are qualitatively unchanged when the cutoff is
1994] 1013
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incentive for banks to make a clean break with incumbent management, in
order to preempt charges that managers are being allowed to keep their jobs
in return for granting the banks special consideration under the firm's
bankruptcy or debt restructuring plan. In addition, banks, as senior secured
lenders, may be less concerned than more junior classes about whether
senior management has experience running the business, and in particular,
whether the firm's going-concern value (in excess of its liquidation value)
will be maximized. Outsiders who have no experience with the firm or the
firm's industry may therefore be more attractive to banks than to sharehold-
ers or subordinated lenders (whose claims are more closely tied to the
firm's going-concern value). Finally, good-faith bargaining between the
firm and its banks may be impossible unless incumbent management is
replaced and a clean break is made from the firm's past failed policies."
Despite sometimes taking an active role in choosing senior managers,
banks rarely sought representation on boards of directors. In only one
instance did banks explicitly receive the right to elect directors; in one
other they were granted veto power in board elections. Presumably, the
banks' reluctance to acquire board seats results from the greater visibility
and the increased risk of legal liability that such representation would
bring. 9 Additionally, during a loan workout, bank representatives tend
to circulate within the debtor company, attend board meetings, and directly
participate in most major management decisions, making a formal presence
on the board unnecessary.
Since the above study necessarily relies on public data, and banks
understandably wish to avoid exposing themselves to the threat of lender
liability or equitable subordination, this evidence clearly provides a lower-
bound estimate of the actual extent of such activity. Only rarely do banks
reduced to one year.
18. For example, Dome Petroleum, while negotiating with lenders to restructure its debt in 1983,
announced that its CEO would be succeeded by the group treasurer of Royal Dutch/Shell. See Dome
Petroleum Ltd. Names Finance Expert as Chairman and Chief, VALL ST. J., June 29, 1983, at A30.
Several of Dome's U.S. bankers reportedly welcomed the change. According to one banker: "It's
terrific news... [Dome doesn't need an] operational oil and gas-type guy, but someone who knows
how to deal with bankers." Id. Another banker suggested that the new CEO's background would help
"restore Dome's credibility with the financial community." Id.
19. As noted by Smith and Warner, banks can be liable to all of the firm's other claimholders,
including public bondholders. Smith & Warner, supra note 6, at 147-48. For example, in Kelly v.
Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 85 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1936), the debtor's banks were charged by
the public bondholders with violating the bond's trust indenture agreement by accepting increased
security from the debtor.
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publicly admit to having had a role in replacing managers. 20  Turnover
statistics also understate the extent of creditor influence on manager
decisionmaking because creditors can exert such influence without actually
replacing managers-for example, by threatening to replace them.2
III. CREDITOR INFLUENCE OVER EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION POLICY
A third way that creditors can influence corporate policies is by setting
managers' compensation. In a recent study,22 the authors analyzed senior
executive compensation policy in seventy-seven publicly held firms that
filed for bankruptcy or restructured their debt out of court during the 1980s.
Table II presents capsule descriptions of eleven cases where creditors
explicitly influenced the terms of such compensation. As with the above
evidence on management turnover, these findings are based on public data,
and thus establish a lower bound on the actual level of creditor influence
in financially distressed firms.
20. The amount of public disclosure of bank involvement in these cases varies considerably. For
example, the resignation of D. Gale Reese as chairman and chief executive officer of Seiscom Delta,
Inc. was reported as being "under pressure from the company's bankers." Seiscom Delta's Reese Quits
Under Pressure As Chairman and Chief WALL ST. J., July 23, 1984, at A13. John R. Waldock,
treasurer of Seiscom Delta, explained Reese's departure as follows: "It's just a matter of the bank being
willing to do certain things provided Gale Reese was not on the team." Id. In contrast, the
appointment of Conrad M. Black as chairman of Massey-Ferguson Ltd. in late 1978 was not publicly
identified as having been caused by creditors until May 1980, following Black's departure.
21. The banks of one bankrupt company that we studied alternatively extended their influence by
demanding that the CEO be given an effective veto over most board decisions (he could be overruled
only by a two-thirds majority of the other directors) in order to facilitate decisionmaking and accelerate
the firm's reorganization. See Gilson & Vetsuypens, supra note 10, at 438 n.18.
22. Gilson & Vetsuypens, supra note 10.
19941 1015
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Table H
Publicly disclosed cases of creditor control over management compensation policy.
Results are based on 77 firms that either filed for Chapter 11 or restructured their debt
out of court during 1981-1987. Source: Stuart C. Gilson and Michael R. Vetsuypens,
CEO Compensation in Financially Distressed Firms: An Empirical Analysis, 48 . FIN.
425 (1993).
Panel A. CEO's compensation or wealth is explicitly tied to creditor wealth
" CEO's bonus is explicitly based on the amount of cash paid to creditors under the
company's Chapter 11 reorganization plan
" No awards can be made under the CEO's bonus plan unless company is current on
its interest payments
" Banks acquire a claim on the CEO's option exercise profits, and he promises to
seek shareholder approval to reduce the option exercise price
" Pursuant to the recommendation of the company's private lenders, senior managers
are to be paid a bonus based on net cash collections from the sale of discontinued
assets
" Management bonuses can only be paid if the company is current on its payments to
public bondholders
" At behest of creditors, the company agrees not to award management stock options
over a specified amount unless it has redeemed a specified fraction of preferred
stock issued under its debt restructuring plan
" Payments under the CEO's severance agreement are explicitly subordinated to
unsecured creditors' claims
" The CEO is to be paid a special bonus upon confirmation of company's reorganiza-
tion plan, with payment to be made in same debt and equity securities that
creditors receive under the plan
" Warrants are issued to the CEO in return for his personal guarantee of subsidiary
debt
Panel B. CEO's compensation is reduced under creditor pressure
- Creditors' committee abrogates recent severance agreement with CEO, reduces and
postpones payments CEO was to receive
Panel C. Creditors propose giving management stronger incentives to maximize
the stock price
• Creditors propose establishing a new incentive plan for the CEO that would result
in grant of options on three million shares
" New stock or stock options are reserved for management under firms' bankruptcy
reorganization or debt restructuring plans (9 firms)
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Over ten percent of sampled firms enacted compensation plans that
explicitly tied the CEO's compensation or wealth to the value of creditors'
claims (Panel A). Most directly, this was accomplished by paying the CEO
a bonus based on total creditor recoveries, or by paying him or her with
the same securities that creditors received under the firm's bankruptcy
reorganization or debt restructuring plan.' This sample is approximately
evenly divided between firms that were bankrupt (five) and firms that
restructured their debt out of court (four). As far as we are aware, these
types of compensation plans are unique to firms in financial distress. If
creditors are the residual claimholders in these firms, such plans promote
economic efficiency by providing managers with stronger incentives to
maximize firm value and, like the covenants documented above, discourage
managers from investing in risky, but unprofitable, projects in an attempt
to increase share values at creditors' expense. In addition, these plans may
enhance firm value by increasing creditors' willingness to settle, thus
shortening the firm's bankruptcy or debt restructuring and allowing it to
conserve on associated legal and other costs.
In another case, creditors were responsible for reducing cash payments
to the ex-CEO under a previously negotiated severance agreement (Panel
B). Based on private conversations with bankruptcy and restructuring
professionals, as well as anecdotal evidence drawn from outside our
sample, we conclude that creditor pressure on management's cash
compensation is much more widespread among financially distressed firms
than is suggested by public reports of such activity. In both bankruptcies
and out-of-court restructurings, management almost invariably has to give
up part of its compensation-even if only symbolically-to induce creditors
and other stakeholders to make meaningful financial concessions; some
bankruptcy and restructuring professionals refer to this as "sharing the
pain."24 In the case of bankrupt firms, the extent to which creditors are
23. One example of such compensation is provided by Southmark Corp., a firm not in our sample,
which proposed paying its CEO an annual bonus after emerging from Chapter I1, with the bonus
payouts to be based on how much cash was paid to holders of the firm's new notes and preferred stock
(2% of total payments between $100 million and $150 million, and 5% of payments above $150
million). In another example, the unsecured creditors committee in Pan Am's bankruptcy proposed
paying the company's top managers a bonus based on the total proceeds from asset sales, the value of
claims distributed to creditors under the reorganization plan, and the number of jobs saved (the
committee included representatives from Pan Am's labor unions).
24. For example, in 1990 the bondholders of Western Union required that the company's Chairman
give up his $2.4 million annual management fee in return for agreeing to restructure the firm's bonds.
John J. Keller, 17T Spreads Cheer to Some Retirees of Western Union, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 1990, at
C13. Similarly, creditors in the recent Greyhound Lines bankruptcy forced the company to cut the
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able to influence the level of management's compensation (or other aspects
of corporate governance) will again depend on the relative importance that
judges attach to the interests of creditors as opposed to those of debtors.2 5
Finally, in over ten percent of the firms that we studied, creditors either
directly or indirectly were involved in setting aside new stock or stock
options for senior managers (Panel C). In one case, bank lenders explicitly
proposed the establishment of a new equity-based incentive plan for the
firm's CEO.2 6 In nine additional cases, creditors played an indirect role
CEO's annual salary from $501,300 to $400,000, and cancel a proposed severance plan that would have
paid its senior executives three years' salary if they were replaced or demoted. Robert Tomsho,
Greyhound's Union Falters in Buy-Out Bid, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 1991, at A9. More systematic
evidence of this bargaining dynamic is found in a recent study of seven financially troubled U.S. steel
producers that sought large wage concessions from their unions. See Harry DeAngelo & Linda
DeAngelo, Union Negotiations and Corporate Policy: A Study of Labor Concessions in the Domestic
Steel Industry During the 1980s, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1991). In years that such concessions were
granted, the study reports, the CEOs of these firms experienced an average 18% decline in their cash
compensation. Id. Arguably, such concessions were important symbolically, but by themselves had
no substantive impact on companies' bottom line.
In our study of CEO compensation in financially troubled finns, we find that such downward
pressure on salary levels tends to be much less pronounced in the case of new CEOs hired from outside
the firm. Gilson & Vetsuypens, supra note 10, at 442-44. We find that the median outside replacement
CEO was actually paid 36% more than his or her predecessor, while the median CEO replacement
promoted from within the firm was paid 35% less than the CEO he or she replaced. Id. This difference
has several plausible interpretations. Outside managers are not tainted by the firm's past poor
performance, and often claim to possess special expertise in turning around troubled companies. Such
managers may also require additional compensation for the risk and emotional stress associated with
running a troubled company. In their study of bankrupt firms, LoPucki and Whitford argue that
managers may also sometimes be able to "grab" additional compensation for themselves as a result of
the leverage that they exert over the bankruptcy negotiations. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 10,
at 740. They characterize 5 of 43 cases in their sample as "grabs," although they concede that their
characterization is based on subjective criteria. Id.
25. In the recent bankruptcy of Zale, for example, the judge, spurred by pressure from the
unsecured creditors, forced the company to substantially lower the cash value of the new CEO's
compensation agreement (from over $4 million to approximately $650,000). See Christi Harlan, Court
Rejects Plan by Zale to Hire a Chief Executive, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 1992, at B6. In explaining his
ruling, the judge noted that "the debtors have closed hundreds of stores, laying off hundreds of
employees ... these estates should not be paying (for the CEO's personal expenses)." Id.
26. The firm in question is Zapata Corporation, which restructured its debt out of court. In its
1987 annual shareholder proxy statement, the company explained management's compensation as
follows:
Pursuant to the proposed debt restructuring, the Company's bank creditors will receive a
substantial portion of the Company's equity securities ... and will have a large and
continuing interest in the success of the Company over the next few years. . . . [The]
inclusion in the restructuring agreement of a provision for the issuance of up to 3,000,000
shares of the Company's common stock under a new management incentive stock plan
evidences the importance which the banks attach to the continuing eftbrts of existing
management of the Company in achieving a successful restructuring.
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in giving management stronger stock-based incentives by approving a
reorganization or restructuring plan that provided for the establishment of
such incentives. These changes in managerial incentives are desirable on
economic grounds because they cause managers' wealth to become more
closely aligned with the value of the firm's residual claims. Importantly,
creditors of the firms we studied also stood to benefit from such changes
because they received large percentage stakes in firms' postreorganization
equity-forty percent on average on a fully-diluted basis. Arguably,
current legal and regulatory restrictions on creditors' ability to hold equity
in nonfinancial firms27 are undesirable because they potentially discourage
adoption of such improved financial incentives for managers.
To investigate whether creditors influenced managerial incentives more
generally in our firms, we estimated ordinary least-squares regressions that
relate annual changes in CEO wealth to corresponding changes in total
shareholder wealth and various empirical proxies for creditor control. The
change in CEO wealth includes the change in the CEO's cash compensa-
tion (excluding profits from exercising stock options) and the change in the
value of his or her stock options and inside stockholdings." The change
in shareholder wealth equals the annual change in the market value of the
firm's outstanding common stock. Regressions are estimated using annual
panel data, with each firm appearing in the sample for up to twelve years
(centered around the start of the firm's bankruptcy or debt restructuring)
based on data availability.
The results of this analysis are shown in Table III. A large, positive
coefficient on the annual change in shareholder wealth variable (denoted
DSHW) means that CEOs have strong incentives to maximize the value of
their firms' common stock. As shown in the table, the estimated coeffi-
cient on DSHW is always positive and statistically significant, regardless
of how the regression model is specified.
ZAPATA CORPORATION, 1987 PROXY STATEMENT 33 (1988).
27. See Gilson, supra note 1.
28. We exclude reported option exercise profits from our calculation of CEO wealth changes
because such profits represent only the transformation of one type of wealth (stock options) into another
(cash), without altering the total amount of wealth. The change in the value of stock options is
approximated by the number of options held by the CEO at the beginning of the year, multiplied by
(1) the annual change in the stock price, and (2) the constant 0.6. The latter value approximates the
average sensitivity of option values to common stock prices as estimated in Michael C. Jensen & Kevin
J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225 (1990). We use
this approximation rather than attempt to value managers' options directly because certain data that need
to be inputted in standard option-pricing models are either unavailable or unreliable. See Gilson &
Vetsuypens, supra note 10, at 449.
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Table III
Estimated coefficients from ordinary least-squares regressions relating annual
changes in CEO wealth to corresponding annual changes in shareholder wealth and
various proxies for creditor control.
Regressions are based on pooled time-series and cross-sectional data for 77 publicly
traded firms that either filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 or privately restructured
their debt to avoid bankruptcy between 1981 and 1987. The change in CEO wealth
equals the annual change in the CEO's reported cash compensation (excluding profits
from exercising stock options) and the corresponding annual change in the value of the
CEO's stock options and his or her inside stockholdings. The change in shareholder
wealth equals the annual change in the market value of the firm's outstanding common
stock. Financial statement and share ownership data are obtained from firms' annual 10-
K reports and shareholder proxy statements. For each firm in the sample, data are
available up to a maximum of twelve years, centered on the start of firms' bankruptcy or
debt restructuring. T-statistics are shown in parentheses.
Explanatory
variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
DSHW 0.0241 0.0259 0.0258 0.0250
(12.6) (13.4) (12.6) (11.7)
BANKD 0.0432 0.0529
(2.5) (2.7)
CREDE. -0.0003 -0.0025
(-1.6) (-1.2)
BANKE -0.002 0.0021
(-0.2) (0.9)
Adjusted R2  0.31 0.31 0.31 0.32
DSHW = Change in shareholder wealth
BANKD = DSHW x the percentage of long-term debt that is owed to banks just prior to
the start of firms' bankruptcy or debt restructuring (set equal to zero in prior
years)
CREDE = DSHW x the percentage of firms' common stock received by creditors under
firms' bankruptcy or debt restructuring plans (set equal to zero in years prior
to bankruptcy or debt restructuring)
BANKE = DSHW x the percentage of firms' common stock received by bank lenders
under firms' bankruptcy or debt restructuring plans (set equal to zero in
years prior to bankruptcy or debt restructuring)
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The regressions also include three interactive terms that measure whether
creditors are likely to be able to exercise control in a particular firm. The
variable BANKD increases with the amount of bank debt that was
outstanding before firms became financially distressed, while CREDE and
BANKE increase with the percentage of outstanding common stock
distributed to creditors and banks, respectively, under firms' bankruptcy or
debt restructuring plans. The positive and significant coefficient on
BANKD in the first and fourth regressions implies that the sensitivity of
CEO wealth to shareholder wealth is significantly higher when firms
initially owe more of their debt to banks. In economic terms, the sum of
the coefficients on DSHW and BANKD in the first regression (0.0241 +
0.0432 = 0.0673) means that when shareholder wealth increased by $1000
in our sample, CEO wealth increased on average by $67.30. (To put this
figure in context, a recent study of solvent firms finds that the same
increase in shareholder wealth is associated with an average CEO wealth
increase of only approximately $3.00.)29 In contrast, neither of the other
two interactive terms (CREDE and BANKE) are significant in any of the
regressions.30
Consistent with the above-reported evidence on creditor-initiated
management turnover, these results suggest that banks play a more
important role in the governance of financially troubled firms than other
types of creditors. In addition, formal voting power conferred by stock
ownership seems to be unimportant in terms of whether creditors are able
to exert influence over corporate policies. The important monitoring role
for banks in financially distressed firms probably reflects banks' financial
sophistication and experience in dealing with defaulted loans relative to
other creditors. In addition, coordination and incentive problems among
banks are probably less severe than, say, among trade creditors or public
bondholders, because the banks are typically fewer in number.
29. See Jensen & Murphy, supra note 28, at 225. The results of this latter study are based on a
sample of 2,213 CEOs who were listed in Forbes' Executive Compensation Surveys from 1974 to 1986.
Some reasons why management compensation is more sensitive to equity values following financial
distress are discussed in Stuart C. Gilson & Michael R. Vetsuypens, Creating Pay-for-Performance in
Financially Troubled Companies, J. APPLIED CoRP. FIN., Winter 1994, at 81.
30. The regression coefficients are qualitatively unchanged when we include measures of firm size
(e.g., the book value of assets) as additional explanatory variables in the regressions. We performed
this check because the positive coefficient on BANKD could simply be capturing a relation between
firm size and managerial equity ownership (managers of smaller firms can afford to own a larger
percentage of firms' common stock), and a relation between firm size and the amount of debt owed to
banks (smaller firms typically make less frequent use of public bond markets, and rely more on bank
debt financing).
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IV. FACTORS THAT ENCOURAGE CREDITOR CONTROL
The above evidence suggests that creditors played an important
governance role in a nontrivial percentage of the firms studied."
However, such control is still far from universal (although, as already
noted, our analysis is limited to publicly reported cases of creditor control).
In Table IV we investigate what factors may be conducive to the exercise
of creditor control in financially distressed firms. We partitioned our
sample into two groups of firms: those where creditors openly exercised
control by forcing out senior managers or setting the CEO's compensation
(seventeen firms), and those where there was no public manifestation of
creditor control (sixty firms). 2
31. Using a different approach to identify cases of creditor control, LoPucki and Whitford found
that management is arguably aligned with creditor interests in slightly over a third (9 of 25) of the cases
they studied involving large, publicly held firms in Chapter 11 (where they felt confident enough to be
able to make such a classification, based on field interviews with bankruptcy attorneys and other
professionals who served in these cases). See LoPucki and Whitford, supra note 10, at 742-47.
32. This classification ignores control conferred by restrictive debt covenants (per Table I),
inasmuch as such covenants were adopted by virtually all firms that restructured their debt out of court.
As for firms that reorganize in Chapter 11, Gilson shows that most debt contracts outstanding prior to
bankruptcy are extinguished under firms' reorganization plans, making a measure of control based on
covenants less meaningful for our purposes. See Gilson, supra note 1.
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Table IV
Relation between creditor control and selected firkn attributes.
Sample consists of 77 publicly traded firms that either filed for bankruptcy under
Chapter I1 or privately restructured their debt to avoid bankruptcy between 1981 and
1987. Income and balance sheet data are obtained from the COMPUSTAT Annual
Industrial and Research tape and the Moody's manuals. Total liabilities + total assets,
total assets, and total revenues are based on information contained in financial statements
that most closely predate the start of firms' bankruptcy or debt restructuring. Differences
in means (medians) are evaluated using a t-test (Wilcoxon rank-sum test).
Mean (median)
Firm attribute
% of long-term debt initially owed to banks
% of common stock received by:
All creditors (undiluted)
All creditors (fully diluted)
Creditors force
CEO change or
tie CEO's pay
to creditor
wealth (N=17)
58.3
(68.0)
25.3
(11.9)
37.8
(42.5)
Banks (undiluted)
Banks (fully diluted)
Total liabilities - total assets
Total revenues ($millions)
Total assets ($millions)
0.86
(0.85)
1,326
191
1,976
277
All other
firms
(N=60)
40.1
(27.0)
p-value for
difference
in means
(medians)
0.11
(0.03)
22.0 0.67
(11.4) (0.83)
35.6 0.80
(27.0) (0.76)
6.1 0.62
(0.0) (0.71)
11.2 0.81
(0.0) (0.47)
0.85 0.90
(0.82) (0.51)
0.15
(0.35)
0.14
(0.36)
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Consistent with earlier evidence presented in our study, the results in
Table IV suggest that creditor control is more likely to be exercised in
financially distressed firms that owe more of their debt to banks (row one).
For the subsample of firms in which creditors exercised control, 68% of
the median firm's long-term debt (face value) was owed to banks; in
contrast, only 27% of long-term debt was outstanding to banks for the
median firm in the subsample where no creditor control was found. This
difference is statistically significant based on a Wilcoxon rank-sum test for
medians (mean values are also significantly different based on a t-test). As
before, explicit stock ownership by creditors, whether calculated on a fully
diluted or undiluted basis, does not appear to be necessary in order for the
creditors to exercise control (rows two to five). One would also expect
secured creditors to be more powerful when they can credibly threaten to
force the firm into liquidation. One proxy for a firm's closeness to
liquidation is the ratio of debt to assets measured just prior to the start of
its bankruptcy or out-of-court restructuring. However, this variable is also
unrelated to our measure of creditor control (row six). Finally, the
presence of creditor control appears to be unrelated to firm size, as
measured by revenues or total assets (rows seven and eight). One might
expect creditors to exercise control more effectively in smaller firms where
they are likely to be fewer in number, making it possible for them to
bargain as a unit.33
V. CONCLUSION
The results of our study suggest that creditors can play a significant role
in the governance of financially distressed public companies. Creditors
exerted direct influence over management hiring and compensation policy
in approximately one-fourth of the firms we studied. In the large majority
of sample firms that restructured their debt out of court, creditors also
indirectly influenced corporate policies through the imposition of highly
restrictive covenants in renegotiated lending agreements. In all cases, such
control was exercised by commercial banks and other institutional lenders,
rather than by trade creditors or public bondholders. This documentary
evidence provides useful behavioral benchmarks for management and
33. This last comparison is possibly confounded by the fact that large firms tend to attract more
media attention, and so may be associated with more publicly reported cases of creditor control (even
if no greater number of actual cases).
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creditors of financially distressed firms. Whether corporate resources are
efficiently allocated when creditors are allowed to exercise control during
financial distress represents an interesting subject for future research.
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